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I. INTRODUCTION
States emerging from conflict generally have very weak institutions and
an influx of outside funds. These two conditions provide incentives for
officials to make corrupt deals for personal gain. Outsiders who are brought
in to monitor and manage the transition are also at risk of becoming corrupt.
The prior conflict is likely to have fostered a culture of secrecy and impunity
where self-dealing is easy to conceal. The end of the conflict may not
encourage the development of a transparent and accountable government,
especially if those who gained financially from the conflict are in power and
seek both to preserve past gains and to benefit from the rebuilding effort.
Thus, although incentives for corruption exist in all societies, the incidence
and scale of corruption may be especially high and destructive in post-conflict
situations. Political leaders buy-off powerful private actors with patronage,
including criminal groups and wealthy business interests. Those powerful
private actors also buy off weak politicians with money or promises of future
jobs and business ventures. The post-conflict political system may be in a
corruption trap where payoffs build in expectation of future payoffs, resulting
in a vicious spiral.'
Unless care is taken, a sharp break with a corrupt status quo can breed
instability and violence as those who benefited from the corrupt system
struggle to maintain their positions.2 If conflict-prevention and peace-building
are supported by outside funds from international institutions, these funds may
simply be diverted into the pockets of the powerful with some trickling down
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1. Alix J Boucher et al., Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States 11-23 (2007),
avaliable at http://www.stimson.orgtfopo/pdf/Mapping-and-Fighting-Corruption-inWar-Tom-States.pdf.
2. Philippe Le Billon, Buying Peace or Fueling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts,
15 J. OF INT'L DEV. 413, 424 (2003).
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to the general population as a way to keep them quiet. Corruption undermines
the reform agenda, and it may be the crutch on which existing leaders rely to
maintain power in a chaotic environment. In the longer term, if corruption is
not limited, it may delegitimize the state, leading to further outbreaks of
violence and extra-legal protest.3
II. CORRUPT OPPORTUNITIES IN POST-CONFLICT STATES
In countries emerging from civil war with weak governments, bribery
demands may be used opportunistically by government officials operating
under unclear rules that allow them to invent offenses or simply to extort funds
from ordinary people. Furthermore, those engaging in illegal activities, such
as smuggling or illicit trade in arms, may need the protection of public
authorities to continue to operate. It may be easier to co-opt public officials
than to hide from them. If the conflict destroyed a country's infrastructure,
governments must contract for major construction projects, creating incentives
for self-dealing.
In allocating aid to the victims of the conflict, officials are supposed to
select needy applicants. However, their exercise of discretion cannot be
perfectly monitored; hence, corrupt motives can distort allocations. The
overall supply of aid may be scarce or open-ended. Examples of scarce aid
include temporary housing materials such as tarps or material to repair
damaged dwellings. Examples of open-ended aid are programs to buy back
weapons where officials must determine whether broken rifles should count.
To further exploit corrupt opportunities, officials may create or threaten to
create delay as a means of extracting bribes. This may be a particularly
effective strategy in the emergency conditions that prevail in the immediate
aftermath of violent conflict.
Corrupt incentives also arise from government programs that impose
costs. Officials can extract payoffs in return for overlooking the illegal
underpayment of taxes or for tolerating illegal activities such as smuggling.
Officials may demand payoffs in exchange for refraining from arresting
citizens on trumped-up charges. In post-conflict countries that are trying to
attract investment capital and avoid capital flight, all these forms of low-level
corruption can make these positive efforts difficult, further slowing down the
process of economic recovery.
3. See Richard Sannerhoim, Legal, Judicial andAdministrative Reforms in Post-Conflict Situatons:
Beyond the Rule of Law Template, 12 J. CoNFIucr & SFc. L. 65, 83 (2007). Sannerholm argues for a focus
on legal, judicial and administrative reform in post-conflict states, including the control of corruption. Id.
at 66. He claims that past law reform efforts have too often focused on high profile human rights areas while
ignoring basic issue of state organization. Id. at 87.
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Corruption at the top of government-in procurement, privatization, or
contracting-can be deeply destructive of state functioning. This can turn a
post-conflict state that is already fragile into a breeding ground for high-level
malfeasance. Corruption may contribute to state illegitimacy and justify those
who threaten renewed fighting. In some cases, a branch of the public sector
may be organized as a bribe-generating machine. This is a particular risk in
post-conflict situations where the formal rules are not well known and cannot
be enforced and where the judiciary is weak and corrupt.
Sometimes the relationship between private wealth and public power does
not involve outright corruption in the form of monetary payoffs. Rather the
problem is what the World Bank Institute calls "crony capitalism" or "state
capture." "State capture" implies that the state itself can be characterized as
largely serving the interests of a narrow group of businessmen and politicians,
sometimes involving criminal elements. Even if the influential group changes
with the government, most of the citizens are left out.4 In post-conflict
settings, the elite are frequently able to capture the political and economic
benefits of reconstruction. If the elite can maintain their power base
throughout the post-conflict period, they can position themselves to benefit
because there are no other credible sources of power and institutional
constraints remain weakened. Reconstruction funds may be diverted into the
private bank accounts of both politicians and business people, making
reconstruction excessively costly, if it even occurs at all.
If top political figures exploit their positions for private gain, the
effectiveness of government programs and the impact of foreign aid and
lending can suffer. Even if those with good political connections are also good
economic managers, there is a long term risk that they will exploit their
dominant positions to squeeze out potential competitors.5 This inequality of
influence can extend beyond special treatment by the executive and legislative
branches to include the courts as well.
But might post-conflict situations provide an opportunity to replace old,
entrenched elites with new, energetic entrepreneurs and more effective
political leaders? If the conflict has destroyed existing patterns of influence,
it may paradoxically represent an opportunity to recreate the state on a fair and
democratically legitimate basis. This is Mancur Olson's view in The Rise and
4. See MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (proposing a taxonomy that includes political systems that manipulate private
firms for personal gain). Johnston "calls this 'power chasing wealth' as opposed to 'wealth chasing power."'
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Measuring Private Sector Corruption 2 (Sept. 2007), availble at
http://www.cmi.no/publications/filel2755=measuring-private-sector-corruption. See JOHNSTON, supra at
37-38.
5. Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1376 (2001).
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Decline of Nations,6 which draws heavily on the post World War HI
experience.7 This seems to be an overly optimistic claim, at least in the case
of Africa where, "the challenges faced by countries emerging from conflict...
are completely different from those faced by Europe after the Second World
War.",8  The conflicts erupted after years of one-party rule and required
rebuilding or establishing the entire machinery of the state.
The goal of anti-corruption reform in post-conflict states is a well-
functioning system where violence is seldom intertwined with politics and
where allegations of corrupt self-dealing lead to a scandal that has negative
political consequences. In such a system, revelations of corruption may tip the
balance against incumbents who are implicated in the wrongdoing. In
contrast, if democracy is entwined with endemic corruption and public order
is less established, elections can be an opportunity for violence against
opponents, individualized payoffs to voters, and corrupt payoffs to politicians.
Colonial heritage, legal traditions, religion, and geographical factors may
explain cross-country differences in corruption and other measures of
government dysfunction,9 but these are not policy variables that present-day
reformers can influence. The key issue is whether these historical regularities
directly affect government quality, or whether they help determine
intermediate institutions and attitudes that present day policies can affect. If
the latter, that may be good news for reformers in post-conflict settings
seeking to create new institutions that facilitate economic growth and high
income. Less optimistically, the destruction of mediating state institutions can
rekindle ethnic, tribal, and religious rivalries.
In countries where threats of violence originate in the private sector,
efforts to limit criminal influence can lead to an increase in violence. For
example, if the crackdown causes a truce between competing gangs or mafias
to break down, violence can result. This is especially likely if corrupt police
or government officials brokered the previous truce. The government's role
as a corrupt peacekeeper may end, but the reformed government may lack the
capacity to be an honest peacekeeper. Police and other law enforcement
6. See MANCUt OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (Yale Univ. Press 1982).
7. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Was Mancur a Maoist? An Essay on Kleptocracy and Political Stability,
15 ECON. & POL'Y 163, 170 (2003).
8. SONNIA-MAGHA Bu-BUAKE JABBI & SALIA KPAKA, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, RECONSTRUCION
NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM SURVEY SIERRA LEONE 2007 19 (2007), available at
http://www.tiri.org/docs/rniss/rniss sierra_leone.pdf.
9. See generally, Edward L Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 271,
272 (2004) (stressing the different institutions associated with different colonial powers); Daron Acemoglu,
Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10037, 2003),
available at http//www.nber.org/papers/w10037 (using the mortality rates of European settlers as an
instrument for the type of colonial regime put in place by the imperial power, and finding that it does a good
job of predicting expropriation risk and corruption levels at the end of the twentieth century).
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officials may be unprofessional and underpaid, and the judiciary may be
unable to handle an increased caseload. As private groups fight for control of
illegal businesses, such as drugs or smuggling, violence may escalate. The
fighting may be restricted to competing criminal groups, but ordinary citizens
will be caught in the crossfire, and the provision of government services may
suffer.
Similar problems can arise when the groups using violence include
guerilla groups, para-military organizations, or even the nation's regular armed
forces. Credible threats of violence can be used to extort payoffs from
ordinary people, businesses, and politicians. Kidnapping may develop into a
business, where threats to harm the victim generate ransom payments. Groups
with the capacity to use violence may combine political and economic
strategies.
Inside the government, powerful military threats may be used as leverage
to force the civilian government to engage in illegal businesses. These
businesses might include the smuggling and resale of luxury items, the
purchase of excessive levels of military equipment as a way to hide kickbacks
to top brass, or the use of soldiers as workers in private business ventures.
If such systems are working well for the extortionists, there may be little
actual violence. Those who are extorted or threatened simply play along and
do not rock the boat. Threats of violence can be costly to the growth and
legitimacy of a fragile democracy even, or perhaps especially, when little
actual violence occurs.
When reform begins, new structures of government and control need to
be available quickly. Otherwise, reforms meant to produce good governance
and the rule of law can degenerate into a spiral of violence and corruption as
citizens attempt to deal with the uncertainty generated by reforms. The rule
of law is intended to introduce clarity and certainty into economic, social, and
political relationships. However, if the rhetoric is not matched by a real
improvement along these dimensions, the stage is set for chaos and a new set
of corrupt incentives.
Peace-building strategies must avoid triggering vicious spirals. An
economy jumpstarted by giving monopoly powers to a few prominent people
or businesses may produce a society that is lacking in equality and
competition. Early decisions can lock in the power of a small elite who then
restrict efforts to enhance competition and fair play. Although it may be risky
and difficult to counter corruption in post-conflict peace-building, if the
problem is not addressed it can undermine other efforts to create a stable, well-
functioning state with popular legitimacy.
To illustrate the way corruption operates in post-conflict countries, the
next few sections use case studies to illustrate the concerns outlined above. To
provide broad geographical coverage, the cases chosen are Guatemala, Angola,
2008]
HeinOnline -- 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.  409 2008
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and Kosovo."° The list is not meant to be representative, but the cases do
include a range of post-conflict situations. The article concludes with some
reform proposals tailored especially to the particular problems of weak, post-
conflict states.
mH. CASE STUDIES: ANGOLA, GUATEMALA, AND Kosovo
Conflicts are of many kinds, and the nature of the conflict affects the way
corrupt incentives arise in the post-conflict period. The cases of Angola and
Guatemala represent brokered peace deals in which weakened or exhausted
rebels agreed to a truce that gave them a stake in the post-conflict state, but
little direct political influence. In Kosovo, in contrast, the dominant ethnic
group, including former fighters against Serbian domination, now controls the
government under a United Nations protectorate. Kosovo has declared its
independence and been recognized by over thirty countries, but its status
remains uncertain given Serbian and Russian opposition.1' Angola's economy
is largely based on natural resource rents. During the conflict the government
controlled the oil reserves. The rebels benefited from control of portions of the
diamond industry. Guatemala is a largely agricultural economy, dependent on
exports of coffee, sugar, and bananas. Both Guatemala and Angola have large,
poor, rural populations. Kosovo has a low per capita income, but income is
not as unevenly distributed as Guatemala or Angola. In all three cases,
outsiders influenced the intensity and duration of the fighting, helped broker
the peace, and provided financial and human resources to aid peace-building.
Angola, a former Portuguese colony, became a pawn in the Cold War because
of its oil wealth. Guatemala has been heavily affected by United States
economic and political interests in the region. Kosovo's location inside Europe
led NATO to intervene militarily and spurred European Union (EU)
involvement in the peace-building efforts.
In spite of the differences outlined above, there are important similarities
between these cases. The parallels include: (1) a pre-conflict regime that did
not represent the interests of a large portion of the population, (2) a brokered
peace deal, (3) contributions to the fighting and to peace-making from wealthy
countries that are not immediate neighbors, (4) physical destruction and
widespread loss of life in some portions of the conflict zone, and (5) a
considerable influx of funds and other aid from outside the country after the
10. For additinal cases see the Reconstruction National Integrity System Survey carried out by Tiri,
a non-governmental organization concerned with the control of corruption worldwide. See Tiri,
http://www.tiri.orgfmdex.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id--98 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
11. An Independent Kosovo Can Never Join UN, Russia Warns, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 17,
2008, http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id--9299507. An updated list of the cuntries that recognize
Kosovo' independence is at www.kosovothanksyou.com.
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peace deal occurred. This led to similar post-conflict pathologies in each case,
although the details differ. The conflict and its aftermath created corrupt
incentives and gave domestic and international actors excuses to overlook
corruption.
Incentives were created by the weakened domestic institutions, on the one
hand, and by the influx of relief and rebuilding funds, on the other. Institu-
tional weakness is partly a reflection of the lack of accountability of the pre-
war states that has been exacerbated by the conflict's destructive impact on
state functioning. The influx of funds and supplies created a pool of benefits
available for theft. The aftermath of the war and the risk of renewed fighting
have been used by domestic politicians as an excuse for their refusal to
implement financial controls, leading to a leakage of funds. Emergency
conditions that require a quick response are used by international donors as a
further excuse for ignoring financial integrity.
A. Guatemala1
2
Corruption is a serious problem in Guatemala.'3  Poverty and
underdevelopment are both a cause and a consequence of corruption, but the
impact of corruption on economic and political development has been
exacerbated by the post-conflict environment.
Guatemala had a GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms of $61.38
billion in 2006 ($35.25 billion at official exchange rates). This implies a per
capita income of $5,000 in PPP terms in 2006. However, income is very
unevenly distributed. The distribution of family income, known as the Gini
coefficient, was 59.9 in 2005, one of the highest in the world. The 2004
estimate of the percentage of the population living below the poverty line was
56%, and the bottom 10% of the population controlled less than 1% of the
income compared with 43.4% of the income controlled by the top 10% of the
population. 14
In 1996, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)
signed the "Firm and Lasting Peace" with the government of Guatemala,
12. Memorandum from Jael Humphrey, Yale Law student with considerable experience in
Guatemala (on file with author).
13. See Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, in TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 329 (2007), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download-gcr#15. Guatemala has a low score of 2.6, where
10 is the best score. Id. Global Integrity rated Guatemala as "weak" in their 2006 integrity index, and it
received especially low scores in administration and civil service. Global Integrity, Guatemala, 2006
COUWrRY REPORTS (2006), available at http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/guatemala/.
14. See CIA, Guatemala, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publicationslthe-world-factbookgeosgt.html. However, on the positive side,
life expectancy is high at almost seventy years. Id.
20081
HeinOnline -- 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.  411 2008
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
officially ending the thirty-six year conflict. 5 Corruption and other forms of
illicit enrichment were prevalent in Guatemala before and during the armed
conflict, and did not end with the accords but rather took new forms. During
the conflict, members of the political and military elite enriched themselves at
the state's expense, but outright coercion may have been more important than
the extortion of bribes. After the peace agreements; with coercive threats
limited, bribe-taking and fraud thrived.
During the war, the army controlled all aspects of the state's administra-
tion, and there was little distinction between state resources and the resources
of those in power. "The lack of transparency and the use of secretiveness, far
from an exceptional state, became the means of governing[.]"'16 Furthermore,
members of the military used their coercive powers both to enrich themselves
and to implement favorable policies. In some cases, local military strongmen
accused neighbors, whose property they coveted, of being dissidents to gain
control of their property, and those expropriated had no legal redress.17 The
weakness of the justice system, which lacked independence, amplified and
reinforced the violence.' 8 Sometimes the potential complainants were simply
eliminated. In one well-documented case, the Guatemalan government
decided to eliminate rather than to re-locate the Mayan-Achi community of
Rios Negro, whose land was located at the site where the government intended
to proceed with a World Bank-financed project to build the Chixoy dam. 9
At the time of the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan state and its army
negotiated from a position of strength relative to the guerilla forces, and the
15. Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, May 21, 1997, 36(2) INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 274.
16. See EDELBERTO TORRES, ACCION CUIDADANA: EL SlSTEMA NACIONAL DE INTEGRIDAD EN
GUATEMALA [THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM IN GUATEMALA] 11 (2001), available at http://
www.transparency.org/content/download/1650/8371/file/guatemala.pdf (La falta de transparencia y el
recurso de la secretividad, propia de un estado de excepci6n, se volvi6 la forma de gobemar, y propici6 que
en el ejercicio del poder se hiciera uso indebido de los recursos de la naci6n.).
17. The recent discovery of meticulously kept police archives has confirmed the fact that during the
conflict the National Police were used to target dissidents, not to combat crime. See Kate Doyle, The
Atrocity Files: Deciphering the Archives of Guatemala's Dirty War, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 2007, at 59-61.
Doyle observed that "the files were not organized to support prosecutions. What was important was the hunt
for subversives." Id. at 60. It was not safe to report crimes, especially those committed by the police. Id.
at 61. In 1982, at the height of the state violence against the civilian population, the Chief of the Joint
Operations Center ordered that complaints made against the security forces "should not be mentioned in any
document." Id.
18. The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) found that impunity was one of the
mechanisms of state imposed terror during the conflict. See generally, CoMISIN PARA EL
EscLARtCIMIENTo HIsTfItco [CEH], GUATEMALA: MEMORIA DEL SI.ENcio, TOMO III [GUATEMALA:
MEMORS OF SI.ENCE TAKF I] (1999).
19. See AMNESTY INT'L, GUATEMALA: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT RISK, AMR 34/019/2004
(2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR34/019/2004/en/dom-
AMR340192004en.pdf.
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post-conflict order reflects the guerillas' comparative weakness. For example,
former dictator Elfrafn Rios Montt served in Congress until a failed run for the
presidency in 2003 and headed a major political party, the Guatemalan
Republican Front (FRG).2 ° The provisions of the Accords of most concern to
the guerillas have been neglected, particularly the articles that pertain to
education and to indigenous rights.2' Recent governments have failed to make
the fiscal and tax reforms called for in the Peace Accords to provide more
revenue for social spending.22
1. Impunity and Corruption
The Peace Accords set up a UN-sponsored truth commission known as
the Commission for Historical Clarification ("CEH") which concluded that the
state of Guatemala bore responsibility for the great brunt of the human rights
violations that took place during the conflict.2 3  The CEH co-exists with a
National Reconciliation Law, passed on December 18, 1996, which provides
amnesty for political crimes committed by both the state and the guerillas
during the conflict, but denies amnesty for crimes of genocide, torture, and
forced disappearance.24 Corruption is not included in the agreement.
20. RACHEL SIEDER ET AL., HEMISPHERE INIATIVES, WHO GovERNs? GUATEMALA FIVE YEARS
AFTER THE PEACE ACCORDS 2 (2002), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/
whogovems.pdf.
21. See generally, Amnesty Int'l, Guatemala, ANNUAL REPORT 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=B2C7E9D14E395DCE80256E9E005A95D6&c--GTM;
AMNESTY INT'L, GUATEMALA DEEP CAUSE FOR CONCERN: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S ASSESSMENT OF
THE CURRENT HUMAN R1GHTS SITUATION IN GUATEMALA, AMR 34/022/2003 (2003), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR34/022/2003; Human Rights Watch, Guatemala, WORLD
REPORT 2005 (2005), available at http://hrw.orglenglish/docs/2005/01/13/guatem9849_txt.htm.
22. See SIEDER, supra note 20, at 53-55. In one instance, the tax rates on alcoholic beverages
included in a statute were halved by Rios Montt and his allies in Congress in a highly irregular process. Id.
at 6. In that case, at least, their legislative tampering was revealed, but they were later exonerated by the
courts. Guatemala: Court Absolves Efrain Rios Montt ofAll Charges in Congressional Guategate Scandal,
ALLBUSINESS, Apr. 26, 2001, http://www.allbusiness.com/central-america779604-1.html.
23. The Commission concluded that 93% were commited by the government but this may be biased
upward because it depended on who came forward to testify. CEH, GUATEMALA: MEMORY OF SILENCE,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
CONCLUSIONS-THE TRAGEDY OF THE ARMED CONFRONTATION 128 (1999), available at http://shr.aaas.
org/guatemala/cehlreport/english/toc.html. The CEH documented 626 villages that were destroyed in
scorched earth counter-insurgency campaigns, the vast majority between 1981 and 1983. Id. 86. Two
hundred thousand people were killed or disappeared during the duration of the conflict, and over one million
were displaced. Id. V 2, 66. )While the Maya represent approximately half of Guatemala's population, more
than 83% of the victims of the armed conflict were Maya. Id. at Annexes, Victims and Violations by Year
and Ethnic Group.
24. Guatemalan Law of National Reconciliation of December 16, 1996 (Erika Abrahamsson trans.,
on file with Harvard International Law Journal) [hereinafter Guatemalan Law]. Abrahamsson states "in
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Political and military actors seek to avoid prosecution even if their
offenses might fall under the exceptions in the amnesty law. Corruption is one
way to insure impunity. The desire of those in power to escape accountability
for their crimes during the armed conflict reinforces the weakness of the
judicial system and other state institutions. One result of this search for
impunity is the lack of official interest in effective mechanisms to counter
corruption. In addition, the relative lack of interest in tackling corruption also
may have a more direct explanation. One observer argues that, "[p]olitical and
military power enabled the accumulation of fortunes by high-ranking officials,
thus making public office an avenue for personal gain. Deficient and
ineffective institutions are an essential factor that furthers corruption in
Guatemala, deepening the culture of impunity. '25 Guatemala's high rate of
inequality 6 is further compounded by the embezzlement of public funds by the
officials in charge of them. Thus, fortunes accumulated during the civil war
are often protected and enhanced through present-day corruption.
One example is the Salvavidas Gang that encompassed military and
government officials at all levels of the Guatemalan government during the
conflict period. 27 Their network centered on the customs-and-duty sector but
stretched through all levels of the Guatemalan state.28 In 1996, the year of the
Peace Accords, the supposed ringleader of the criminal syndicate Alfredo
Moreno Molina was arrested and accordingly customs revenues reportedly
doubled. 29 Another source reports that Moreno Molina and his associates had
been stealing 30% of the customs revenue collected.3 ° The attorney general
estimates that Moreno Molina and his associates siphoned off as much as $15
million U.S. dollars annually. 31 Prosecutions of the corrupt officials involved
in the Salvavidas Gang slowly wove their way through the court system.
Moreno Molina was arrested and his assets were frozen, but they were released
conformity with the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, it is within the power of the
Congress of the Republic, when demanded by public convenience, to exempt political and related crimes
from penal responsibility." Id. at art. 1, See also William W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying
Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis ofAmnesty Legislation, 42 HARv. INT'L L.J. 467, 506, 509
(2001).
25. Giorleny D. Altamirano, The Impact of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 38
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 487, 538-39 (2007).
26. See SIEDER, supra note 20, at 3.
27. Global Integrity, Guatemala Corruption Timeline, 2006 COUNTRY REPORTS (2006), available
at http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/guatemala/timeline.cfm [hereinafter Timeline].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See SIEDER, supra note 20, at 9.
31. Timeline, supra note 27.
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so that he could make bail.32 His bail was subsequently lowered to $1 million.
He has not yet been prosecuted and remains free in Guatemala.33
Similarly, former president Alfonso Portillo fled to Mexico after his four-
year term ended in January 2004.34 He has been charged with embezzling
more than $15 million, and at least 10 former officials from his government,
including his vice president, are in jail on corruption charges. 5 It was first
alleged in 2002 that President Portillo and his vice president, Francisco Reyes
Lopez, had opened bank accounts in Panama with the intention of diverting
Guatemalan state funds.36 The Panama Connection, as the embezzlement
scheme was called, involved the alleged transfer of $1.5 million every month
from fake companies into the private accounts.37
2. Judicial Corruption
A particular concern is corruption in the judiciary. Prosecutions of
corruption are unlikely to succeed if the judiciary itself is venal. Even worse,
false accusations can be used to undercut political opposition. In the World
Bank's 1997 preliminary diagnostic, Guatemala's judiciary was named the
most corrupt institution. The report further linked mistrust in the institution
with the thirty-six year conflict. 38  Guatemala's judicial system is non-
functional; impunity is the norm for crimes of both the past and the present.
"Most Guatemalans have rightly tended to see the law as something that
operates for the benefit of the powerful rather than as a resource to protect
their fundamental rights."39 The justice system is regarded as under-funded,
inefficient, and inaccessible particularly for the country's poor indigenous
majority. 4
Guatemala's attempts to prosecute violations of past abuses have usually
been unsuccessful. Complaints launched decades ago remain in their in-
vestigatory phases, and the vast majority of current crimes are never
prosecuted.41 To date, no high-level perpetrators have been punished for their





37. Timeline, supra note 27.
38. MARIA GONZALEZ DE Asis, BORRADOR GUATEMALA REFORMA JUDICIAL YCORRUPCI6N [DRAFr
GUATEMALA JUDICIAL REFORM AND CORRUPTION] (1998), http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governancet
guatemala/pdf/guatjudrefcorr.pdf.
39. SIEDER, supra note 20, at 33.
40. Id.
41. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Guatemala, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, (2006), avilable at
2008]
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roles in the 626 massacres documented by the CEH.42 During the armed
conflict, those reporting violations were turned away or prosecuted them-
selves. Today Guatemalan justice still confronts delays exceeding decades;
tampering with and loss of evidence by the prosecutor's office; and
intimidation of witnesses, lawyers, and judges. Not only does the justice
system not prosecute the crimes of the past, it is also unsuccessful at
prosecuting current crimes. Those with a vested interest in maintaining
impunity prefer the judiciary to be ineffective.
In one suspected case of high-level judicial corruption, or at least a case
of illicit influence, in 2003 Guatemala's Constitutional Court invalidated the
provision of the Constitution that barred former coup participants from
running for president.43 Former military dictator Efrain Rios Montt appealed
the constitutional provision repeatedly over the years, and every time the
courts ruled against him." Undeterred, he continued to appeal. The three
judges selected to hear the appeal had been appointed by Rios Montt's political
party, the FRG.45 The selection process, done by lottery, was completed
behind closed doors with no witnesses except the court's president, a FRG
former minister.'
Nevertheless, prosecutions do sometimes occur and on occasion lead to
jail sentences. Most Guatemalans expect that their leaders are corrupt so
that "these allegations [do not] represent anything new in Guatemalan
http://www.state.gov/g/drlI/rls/hrrpt2OO6I78893.htm; see also AMNESTY INT'L, GUATEMALA APPEALCASE:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY REMAIN UNPUNISHED IN GUATEMALA, AMR 34/035/2006 (2006), available
at http://www.amnestyusa.orgldocument.php?lang=e&id=ENGAMR340352006 (discussing prolonged
delays in Guatemalan appeals cases); AMNESTY INT'L, GUATEMALA'S LETHAL LEGACY: PAST IMPUNITY AND
RENEWED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AMR 34/001/2002, 2002, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/AMR34/001/2002
42. For example, nine years of litigation was nullified by the December 2004 decision by the
Guatemalan Court of Appeals in the Dos Erres case. The Court ruled that crimes committed during the
armed conflict must be first submitted for the Court of Appeals to evaluate the application of the Law of
National Reconciliation. This ruling was made despite the fact that the Court of Appeals had already
concluded that the Dos Erres case did not qualify for amnesty. See, e.g., Simon Watts, Guatemala Halts
War Crimes Trial, BBC INT'L., Feb. 5, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4238417.stm.
43. Sieder, supra note 20, at 5.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Editorial, Guatemalan Power Play, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at Al.
46. Id.
47. General Roberto Letona, Guatemala's military attachd in Washington, D.C., was accused of
stealing nearly $2.7 billion U.S. dollars in tax revenue over 15 years. Timeline, supra note 27. In 2001,
Interior Minister Byron Barrientos was prosecuted for embezzling $10 million of public funds, and in 2004
former Finance Minister Eduardo Weymann received a thirteen year sentence for stealing $4 million. Id.
In 2005, the United States deported Junior Vinivio Abadio-Carrillo, the son of Marco Tulio Abadio-Molina,
the former Tax and Customs Authority Director, was charged with conspiring with his father to divert $5
million of tax funds for his personal use. Id. Interior Ministry official Angel Argueta siphoned $10 million
of public funds in 2006. Id.
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politics."48  The only surprise is that a few officials have actually been
prosecuted in the post-conflict period.
The relative lack of rule of law creates incentives for personal deal-
making and bribes.49 The judicial branch is staffed with under-paid, poorly
trained officials without full independence and subject to influence from elite
groups.5 0 Furthermore, the existing system has been overwhelmed by the
surge in crime since the mid-1990s; backlogs and delays further cripple the
system. Twenty-five percent of judges and eighty-seven percent of public
prosecutors acknowledged that they had been pressured by superiors or
influential parties.5
The Supreme Court controls promotions within the judiciary, and it is not
uncommon for those denouncing the interference of the Supreme Court to be
investigated themselves. For example, one judge was dismissed after she
made complaints of judicial corruption.52 In addition to the judiciary, the
prosecutor's office is also riddled with problems that impede efficiency and
honesty, such as high turnover rates, vacancies, low salaries, and poor training.
In many instances public prosecutors fail to initiate investigations and drag
their feet on politically-sensitive matters. 3
A 2006 World Bank Study advises companies to be careful when
conducting business in Guatemala. A weak and corrupt judiciary is a prime
concern of companies as it impedes the settlement of private disputes,
especially those concerning property rights. Companies are generally advised
to conduct extensive due diligence before investing in Guatemala,54 and to
include third-party arbitration clauses in contracts as a means to side-step the
Guatemalan courts.
3. Reparations
Civil wars frequently impose huge costs on portions of the civilian
population. The Guatemalan Truth Commission recommended reparations as
a way to restore the dignity of the victims of the armed conflict and guarantee
that the violence would not be repeated.55 The State of Guatemala has yet to
48. SIEDER, supra note 20, at 7.
49. Id. at 33.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 35.
52. Id. at 35.
53. See SIEDER, supra note 20, at 35-36.
54. See generally WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 2008 GUATEMALA: A PRoJECT
BENCHMARKING THE REGULATORY COST OF DOING BUSINESS IN 178 ECONOMIES, avilable at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/CountryProfdes/GTM.pdf.
55. CEH, supra note 23, at Recommendations-Reparatory Measures f 7-21.
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thoroughly institute a functioning reparations program. 6 In 2003, the state
inaugurated the National Reconciliation Plan ("NRP") headed by Rosalina
Tuyuc, a former indigenous leader. However, in 2004, the NRP only spent
two-million on reparations of the thirty-million quetzales allocated in the
budget. Three years later, the group "the Movement of Victims" asserted that
in four years of operation, the NRP had only managed to distribute reparations
totaling four-million quetzales to 200 victims." Eighty-percent of the money
spent went towards operating costs, and there were allegations that the office
hired more people than necessary, many lacking adequate qualifications.58 The
staff was subsequently cut from 190 to 95 people. After the continued failure
to distribute the money to victims of the conflict, in 2005 the Guatemalan
government redirected 260 million quetzales, approximately $33 million U.S.
dollars, from the NRP budget to aid the victims of Hurricane Stan.59 Victims'
organizations complained that these funds should not have been taken from the
NRP budget. Indeed, many allege that the slow and irregular execution of the
plan counteracts the symbolic benefits of the reparations.
In the face of the failure to give financial reparations to the victims of the
armed conflict, the state has managed to distribute payments to former
members of the Civil Defense Patrols,6° which the CEH concluded was
responsible for 18% of the armed conflict's human rights violations.61 The
reorganization of the Civil Defense Members, or Patrullas de Autodefensa
Civil ("PAC"), in order to receive the payment was traumatizing for many
survivors of the armed conflict and did nothing to reassure the victims that the
crimes could not reoccur.62 Here the problem is not corruption per se but
rather the diversion of funds, designed to aid the victims of civil war.
However, outright corruption is suggested by the high spending on operating
costs, implying make-work jobs, and the leakage of funds into favored
pockets.
56. See NETWORKIN SOLIDARITY WITHTHEPEOPLEOFGUATEMALA, PRIORITIZE WAR VICrTIMS OVER
FORMER PARAMILITARIES (2004), available at https://www.nisgua.orgget_involved/speakersjtour/profitl
tour_actions/Priortize%20War%20Victims.pdf.
57. Lorena Seijo, Resarcimiento: Ultimdtum al Gobierno; Victimas del ConflictoArmado Demandan
Pago [ Ultimatum to the Government; Victims of the Armed Conflict Demand Payment], PRENSA LIBRE, May
26, 2006, available at http:llwww.prensalibre.com/pl/2006/mayo/26/142601.html.
58. Carlos Menocal, Fondo de victimas de la guerra usado para Stan: Monto estaba por irse afondo
comin, debido afalta de ejecucidn [Victim's Funds from the War Used for (Hurricane) Stan], PRENSA
LIBRE, Mar. 20, 2006, available at http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2006/marzo/20/137330.html.
59. Id.
60. Julieta Sandoval, Pago a ex PAC con bonos del Tesoro [Payment to Former CAP with Treasury
Notes], PRENSAIBRE, Nov. 4,2004, available at http:llprensalibre.com/pl/2004/noviembrelO4/100860.htmil
61. CEH, supra note 23, at Annexes, Violations by Responsible Force.
62. INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, OEA/Ser.lUV/I.1 18, Doc. 5
rev. 2 (Dec. 29 2003), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/chap.4b.htm.
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4. Ordinary Crime: Drug Cartels, Gangs, and Police Corruption
Illegal and criminal activity flourishes in the weak Guatemalan legal
environment. Criminal gangs support themselves with the drug trade,
smuggling, and money laundering. Organized crime networks flourished
during the armed conflict. Weak institutions and the failure of the state to
thoroughly consolidate power after the war provided the space for these
networks to operate, often with the corrupt connivance of public authorities.
The weakness of the political parties and the failure to purge the old security
apparatuses "make[s] it easier for organized criminal gangs rooted in
clandestine counterinsurgency structures to maintain and extend their political
influence in the post conflict period." 63 There is some evidence that after the
Peace Accords were signed, death squad networks, which were active during
the conflict, switched to illegal criminal activity.'
The existence of illegal bodies and clandestine security apparatuses is
also an impediment to effectively confronting impunity in Guatemala. These
networks protect powerful individuals and intimidate judges and witnesses.
Assassinations and attacks on several prominent human rights activists and
their offices have been traced to the clandestine power structure.65 These
networks have a vested interest in maintaining impunity and preventing the
development of more effective law enforcement and judicial institutions, "both
to protect their members (some of whom were implicated in human rights
violations during the conflict) and to ensure their continuing ability to operate
freely."'  The Salvavidas Gang or the Moreno network, discussed above,
represents one of the worst examples of entrenched parallel power structures.
The drug trade has proliferated in Guatemala in recent years. Corruption
in Guatemala is considered as the single biggest obstacle to the U.S. anti-
narcotics program.67  With stricter enforcement mechanisms in Mexico,
Guatemala has emerged as a popular alternate route for Colombian cocaine
smugglers.68 The United States determined in April 2003 that Guatemala had
failed demonstrably to adhere to its international counter-narcotics commit-
ments during the previous year.69 Guatemala was decertified as a partner in
63. SIEDER, supra note 20, at 11.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 7.
66. Id. at 11.
67. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 2003: CANADA, MEXICO,
AND CENTRAL AMERICA (2004), avilable athttp://www.state.gov/pflnl/rlslnrcrpt/2003/volI/html/29833.htm.
68. N.C. Aizenman, Endurance ofCorruption Shakes Guatemala Anew HopesforAnti-Drug Leader
End with Arrest, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2006), availble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/articlel2006/03/10/AR2006031001928_pf.htm.
69. U.S. DEP'T OF ST., BUREAU OFW. HEMISPHERE AFF., BACKGROUND NOTE: GUATEMALA, (2007),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htn (on file with author). See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
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the war against drugs for the following year. In 2006, the U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Agency arrested Guatemala's top anti-narcotics officer, Adan Castillo,
on smuggling charges.70 Castillo had been brought in to reform the troubled
Guatemalan drug agency, but instead he accepted payoffs from drug traffickers
to escort them through the territory. Drug-related violence continues to plague
the country.
The Guatemalan police often function like a gang working for its
members own benefit rather than for that of the general population.
Favoritism and influence-peddling apparently dominate the selection process
into the police force.7 A survey examining data from 1997 to 1999 found that
not a single civilian-initiated complaint against the police resulted in
punishment.72 In fact, no punishments were imposed for abuse of the public
during this time period. 7' The police force has proved inadequate to confront
the increase in crime, and the army is often called in to assume police
functions, a clear violation of the Peace Accords. Of course the drug trade
coupled with a corrupt police force exists in many societies, but the post-
conflict situation in Guatemala is particularly fertile ground, in part, because
of the state actors' lack of interest in the control of corruption.
5. Conclusion
Although Guatemala's legal code outlaws corruption, those who attempt
to combat corruption do not typically fare well. Attacks on human rights
advocates are common, and lawyers and members of civil society who work
to end impunity and prosecute the crimes of the past are frequently targeted for
attacks.74 Many of these attacks are linked to human rights violators during the
war who refuse to be held accountable for their past crimes. Frequently, the
same tactics are deployed against those working against criminal gangs and
embezzlement. In March 2003, Karen Fischer, the anti-corruption public
prosecutor was forced to resign after refusing to drop an investigation against
President Portillo.75 After receiving death threats, she and her family fled to
Mexico.76 Approximately six months later, another prosecutor, Tatiana
LATIN availble at AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ISSUES FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS (2003),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31726.pdf
70. Aizenman, supra note 68.
71. SIEDER, supra note 20, at 39.
72. Id. at 40.
73. Id. at 39.
74. See AMNESTY INT'L, GUATEMALA: HUMAN RIGHTS AcrVSTS UNDER RENEWED ATTACK IN
2005, AMR 34/007/2005 (2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR34/007/2005.
75. Timeline, supra note 27.
76. Id.
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Morales, investigating the same case, also fled to Mexico after receiving death
threats.77
The press does not escape the pressure from Guatemala's clandestine
networks. Jose Ruben Zamora is the owner of one of Guatemala's leading
independent newspapers, El Periodico. He and his family suffered a brutal
home invasion after El Periodico published an article linking the Portillo
government to enrichment from gang activity, including drug trafficking,
kidnapping, and extortion. 78  The report, a culmination of eight years of
research, drew connections between leaders of organized crime and
government and military leaders.79 In June 2003, the Zamora family was held
hostage for three hours in their home where they were beaten, interrogated,
and threatened to "stop bothering the people above."'
The cycle of impunity feeds into the cycle of corruption. The lack of
strong institutions feeds into the criminal networks. "There is a kind of vicious
cycle in which weak institutions create opportunities for the spread of corrupt
networks, which in turn seek to further weaken institutional capacity to combat
corruption." 81
B. Angola82
Angola and Guatemala have similar population sizes-12.7 million for
Guatemala and 12.3 million for Angola-and highly unequal distributions of
income and wealth. Both are emerging from protracted civil wars where the
rebels essentially lost militarily but were included in a bargained settlement
and now operate as a political party in opposition. The Angolan fighting has
persisted on and off since independence from Portugal in 1975 until April
2002. The fighting was mostly between the government, which was controlled
by a single political party, Movimento Popular de Libertafdo de Angola
("MPLA"), and a rebel group, Unido Nacional par a Independincia de Angola
("UNITA").
Unlike Guatemala, Angola has a major source of foreign exchange in its
off-shore petroleum reserves. Thus, a central issue is the management of this
resource and the lack of transparency concerning the inflows and outflows of
77. Id.




81. SIEDER, supra note 20at 11.
82. The section on Angola is based on a series of memos prepared by Rodrigo Souza, Yale Law
School, LLM '08.
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oil revenues.83 Guatemala struggles to collect taxes from its poor citizens and
its wealthy elite. Angola is awash in funds, but it fails to use them effectively
to benefit the bulk of the population. Because of the rise in oil prices, its GDP
growth rate was 14% in 2 006.8 GDP in purchasing power parity ("PPP")
terms was $54.65 billion in 2006 ($28.88 billion at official rates) for a per
capita income of $4,500 in PPP terms.8 Yet the poverty rate is over fifty
percent, and life expectancy is under thirty-eight years.86 In Guatemala,
corruption facilitates the drug trade and provides impunity to the wealthy and
powerful. In Angola, corruption diverts the stream of petroleum rents into
private bank accounts. A report from the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2003,
soon after the war ended, found that in Angola there were 39 individuals worth
between U.S. $50 million and $100 million, and another twenty individuals
were worth at least U.S. $100 million, for a total of at least U.S. $3.95 billion.
All seven at the top of the list were present or past government officials.87
Suppose that this wealth earns a rate of return of ten percent for a flow of U.S.
$395 million. This implies an average income of U.S. $6.7 million per person
in the top group even before the run up in oil prices, which presumably
disproportionately benefited those individuals.
MPLA, the governing party, originated as a Marxist nationalist party
during the independence struggle. During the Cold War and throughout a
significant part of the Angola's almost thirty years of civil war, it received
military and diplomatic support from the USSR and other Soviet bloc
countries, including Cuba. At the same time, UNITA, initially aided by the
Chinese, began to receive aid from the West, especially the United States and
South Africa. The MPLA, which remains in power to this day, began the
process of shifting to a privatized economy in the 1980s. Hence, some of the
challenges faced by Angola are similar to those faced by countries
transitioning from socialism, such as Russia and others in the Soviet bloc.
83. Angola also has diamond deposits, which were largely under UNITA control during the civil war.
84. It was 12% in 2004 and 19% in 2005. CIA, Angola, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
https:lwww.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbooklgeoslao.html#ntro.
85. Id.
86. Id. The CIA reports that, according to 2003 data, 70% of the population was below the poverty
line. Life expectancy is a 2007 estimate.
87. Economist Intelligence Unit, Angola: Country Report, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME
TRANSPARENCY, No AccouNTABILrrY: THE USE OF OIL REVENUES IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 43 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angolaOl04/angolaOl04.pdf. TONY
HODGES, ANGOLA: ANATOMY OF AN OIL STATE 113 (Indiana Univ. Press, 2004) (first published in 2001 as
Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism).
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1. Extra-Budgetary Accounts
During the conflict, Angolan officials used the civil war as an excuse for
large military budgets and for a lack of transparency surrounding spending.
After the conflict ended, government budgets remained large as the destruction
of infrastructure required a widespread rebuilding program. However,
although some secrecy could be justified on national security grounds, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) points out that even during the war, the government
could have been transparent concerning spending in the parts of the country
under their control and with respect to the resources generated by the off-shore
oil industry, which was never threatened by the rebels. 8 The IMF documents
the high level of "unexplained" expenditures from 1997 to 2002 which totaled
U.S. $4.22 billion over this period or about 9.25% of GDP per year.89
According to HRW, that total is close to total spending of $4.27 billion on
social and humanitarian programs.90 Furthermore, some of the recorded
military expenses also probably incorporated corrupt kickbacks. According
to HRW, "the most serious impediment to development was the government's
mismanagement of the economy and not the war."9' The war gave the
government a convenient excuse to use secrecy as a cover for corruptly-
acquired gains. HRW presents several cases to illustrate how a lack of trans-
parency apparently hid large payments that enriched the country's leaders. 92
As Hodges writes:
Institutional weaknesses may result in the bypassing of formally
established budget execution procedures, and lack of transparency
could also serve as a convenient cover for fraud and diversion of
funds. Here, it is important simply to note the scale of extra-
budgetary operations and the concern that this has aroused in the
international financial institutions.93
88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 87, at 44.
89. IMF, ANGOLA STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2002 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION 31-33 (2002); IMF,
ANGOLA: SELECTED ISSUES AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX 107-08 (2003) (cited in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 87, at 33, 44-45). The IMF staff report shows that twenty-two percent of government
expenditure made between 1996 and 2001 was "unexplained," that is, not recorded in the official budget
execution accounts. Besides this, sixteen percent of expenditure was extra-budgetary but recorded in the
fiscal accounts ex post. Taken together, the unrecorded expenditures, along with those recorded ex post,
amounted to $10.2 billion between 1996 and 2001, or thirty-eight percent of total expenditure in this period.
Even during the years when an IMF Staff Monitored Programs (SMP) were being implemented, more than
one fifth of government expenditure was extra-budgetary (either recorded ex post or unrecorded): 27.5%
in 2000 and 23.8% in 2001. HODGES, supra note 87, at 130.
90. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 87, at 1, 72.
91. Id. at 45.
92. Id. at 47-56.
93. HODGES, supra note 87, at 126.
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The problem of extra-budgetary operations remained unresolved even after
alerts from the IMF.94 The state-owned oil enterprise, Sonangol, appears to be
at the center of the corruption involving extra-budgetary operations, especially
through its off-the-books borrowing practices. Thus, an audit by KPMG in
2002 found a discrepancy of $2.0 to 2.6 billion between the oil revenues
claimed by the Ministry of Finance and those deposited in the Central Bank.
Discrepancies of $114 to $418 million existed between Sonangol's reported
tax and royalty payments and those recorded on the Ministry of Finance's
books. Furthermore, it significantly underpaid its taxes. 95 An IMF staff report
raised
concerns about the handling and disposition of oil and diamond
concessions, revenue flows in the oil sector, the finances of Sonangol,
and external borrowing practices, and argued that 'an effective policy
response is urgently needed to make public finances transparent,
strengthen institutions, establish a system of institutional checks and
balances, and improve public procurement practices."9
After the end of the fighting, with no military threat present, the government
passed several laws that criminalized and restricted information. According
to HRW, the most restrictive of these is the State Security Act, passed on July
19, 2002, that criminalizes possession of documents that the government
considers sensitive, even if lawfully obtained by those outside the government.
Penalties can be imposed on both public officials and recipients of the infor-
mation, and the law has extra-territorial reach.97 Such restrictions help
maintain and enhance the wealth of the incumbent politicians who stayed in
power after the end of the conflict and of other well-connected families and
businesses.
2. Transferring Benefits to the Elite
During the civil war, members of the politically-connected elite were able
to enrich themselves. The fighting did not much affect their ability to extract
funds from the state and provided an excuse for secrecy and large public
budgets. As suggested above and outlined in the HRW and IMF reports,
corruption often took the form of thinly-disguised theft of state resources by
94. Id. at 128.
95. KPMG, CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE ANGOLAN PETROLEUM SECTOR: INSPECTION REPORT BY
KPMG FOR THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA (2002). The report performed under an
IMF contract was never formally released, but Human Rights Watch obtained a copy. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 87, at 21, 23, 27.
96. HODGES, supra note 87, at 121.
97. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 87, at 47-48.
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political leaders, or at least, of the use of state funds to support a lavish official
lifestyle. However, other mechanisms were also used to reward supporters,
often permitting some of the oil wealth to flow by indirect methods into
private bank accounts. Hodges discusses four methods; none is unique to
Angola, but their impact obviously depends on the available economic
opportunities. The four impacts are as follows: (1) privileged access to foreign
exchange at official rates, (2) privileged access to credit at low official interest
rates, (3) privileges granted through restrictions on competition, and (4)
privileged access to the purchase of state-owned land and businesses.
During the war, foreign exchange was in short supply. Until 1999, when
the currency was allowed to float, the politically-connected elite were granted
privileged access to foreign exchange at the official-and below the market-
level. This was a way to transfer some of the state's oil wealth to these
favored few. By keeping the official rate low, the government could ration the
supply. This was not done in a rational, transparent manner. Rather, "the
political authorities simply informed the banks which individuals should
receive the foreign exchange on offer."9
The second mechanism was the allocation of credit, and with it,
privileged access to interest rates at the low official level. This rate was below
the rate of inflation so that the real interest rate was negative. According to
Hodges, "[s]tate-owned banks ... allocated credit on the basis of administrative
directives received from the central bank or higher political authorities." 99
This policy was also ended in 1999, but the overhang of bad loans will persist
for many years.0 ° The third mechanism of state patronage was the imposition
of restrictions on competition, which was used to protect or foster the
businesses of those with political connections.'O
Grants of monopoly power were often combined with the fourth
mechanism of privatizing state-owned farms, businesses, and other enterprises
to produce economic rents for the new owners. Begun in 1988, privatization
favored those politically connected to state officials:
The main focus was on privatizing small businesses, which were
reserved for Angolan rather than foreign investors. It is noteworthy
that the privatization of small companies took place without proper
valuations or competitive bidding. As a result, army officers and
other high-ranking officials were able to acquire farms and other
98. HoDGES, supra note 87, at 131.
99. Id. at 133.
100. Id. at 134.
101. Id. at 138.
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businesses as political favors, often for nominal sums or for no
payment at all. 102
In the process, the peasants who occupied many privatized farms did not have
their interests taken into consideration. Hundreds of former state farms were
sold, "benefiting well-connected families of the politico-military elite at the
expense of small peasants, who had been occupying and tilling much of the
land of the former state farms on an ad hoc basis, without land titles, since the
mid-1980s. ' O3 Similarly, redistribution to the favored elite occurred in the
cities:
After independence, almost all housing in the modem "asphalt" part
of Luanda and other cities had been nationalized, because of the flight
of the Portuguese settlers.... The state in effect presided over the
transfer of properties for a fraction of their true value, at enormous
cost to government revenue. This can only be explained as an act of
self-enrichment on the part of the high officials who acquired some of
the best properties and, more generally, as a strategy to cultivate the
continuing loyalty of the MPLA's traditional urban constituency."
Taken together, these mechanisms permitted a massive transfer of wealth to
elite supporters of the MPLA. All relied on the essential lack of transparency
of state operations and on the inability of ordinary citizens to hold public
officials to account. According to Hodges, some of the beneficiaries were:
[A] nexus of families that are closely linked to the centers of power
through marriage, business relations, political connections and high
positions in the security forces and administration. At their kernel is
the presidential family itself. The family's extensive business
activities... have been made possible by the opaque administrative
mechanisms described ...[above.] While these interests remain
entrenched within the system, and patronage is used as a strategy for
buying loyalty and cementing alliances, it will be difficult to move
decisively towards more transparent, accountable systems of resource
management and more competitive markets, even though conjunctural
economic imperatives or financial necessities may dictate periodic
bursts of reform. 5
102. id. at 135.
103. HODGES, supra note 87, at 135-136.
104. Id. at 137.
105. Id. at 139-40.
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3. Conclusions: Natural Resources, Conflict, and Corruption
In Angola, corruption helps facilitate the enrichment of the elite through
the appropriation of state resources, especially oil revenues. Thus, Angola's
case demonstrates the way natural resource endowments can fuel corruption
with the consequence that few benefits trickle down to the population at large.
The basic argument for this "resource curse" is that a resource-rich state does
not need to depend on its citizens to accumulate government revenues but can
use resource rents to finance the state. Hence, rulers have little incentive to
satisfy the demands of ordinary people so long as they can use resource rents
to support a security service to keep them in power. Furthermore, with so
much money flowing into state coffers and, corruptly, into the private bank
accounts of the political elite, talented people enter public office where they
can get rich and ignore the private sector.
Angola, however, provides an extra twist on this story related to the long-
running civil war. First, the guerilla group also had access to a natural
resource--diamonds-that was easy to transport and trade."° These resource
rents helped keep the war going along with outside help from sympathetic
nation states. Second, the security threat provided a cover for the political and
economic elite to enrich themselves. They could claim that large military
expenditures were needed, appropriate some of the funds, and then justify
secrecy about the use of funds on national security grounds. Once the fighting
ended, national security continued to be used as an excuse to limit
transparency and even to increase penalties for leaking information. For the
most part, those in power during the fighting remained in control of
government. Hence, they have no interest in a retrospective accounting. The
level of malfeasance and unjust enrichment that took place during the fighting
has helped fuel the government's interest in limiting information.
At present, given the international focus on corruption and the sensitivity
of both the IMF/World Bank group and the major international oil companies
to the issue, Angola is taking some steps towards reform in cooperation with
these outside actors. The IMF reports some progress in Angola's system of
financial management but notes the need for improvement. 7 Of particular
concern is the continued lack of transparency of the accounts of Sonangol, the
national oil company, which are still excluded from the government
accounts."' Although not mentioned by the IMF, a further concern is the
government's extensive contracts with Chinese firms that express little concern
regarding irregular payments and the lack of transparency.
106. See Le Billon, supra note 2 at 6; HODGES, supra note 87, at 2.
107. IMF, ANGOLA: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2007 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION 9-10, 15, IMF County
Report No. 07/354 (2007).
108. Id.
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In spite of the IMF's encouragement, the government is not part of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that would require disclosure of
payments made to and received by the Angolan government. 1°9 The Angolan
authorities "questioned the merits of joining" and claimed that "oil companies
have positively assessed Angola's bidding practices."" This hardly seems a
sufficient justification because transparency is valuable not simply to generate
a fair bidding process but also to permit more public oversight of the size and
use of government revenues. According to a Save the Children report in 2005,
"[o]f the seven companies with operations in Angola that were surveyed, only
Chevron Texaco disclosed details of a payment" with the agreement of the
government of Angola."'
Finally, the country lacks the capacity to administer complex systems of
procurement, data gathering, transparency, and accountability. It is in the
difficult situation of needing to carry out a massive rebuilding task with weak
administrative capacity. However, if corruption remains a major source of
inefficiency in allocating and monitoring the rebuilding effort, then those
involved have little incentive to create the kind of capacity and financial
control urged by the IMF. The problem is not just capacity, but also political
will. As the Kosovo case discussed next illustrates, one solution is the use of
expatriate monitors or advisors with expertise and authority to act. However,
that solution can face difficulties if international advisors end up becoming
part of the corrupt system. Although Kosovo presents a mixed case, it does
suggest that such strategies can succeed under some conditions. In Angola, of
course, foreign exchange from oil and, to a lesser extent, from diamonds, give
its government leverage to resist external pressures for reform at the same time
as its weakly-developed political system limits the impact of popular protest.
C. Kosovo"
2
Kosovo provides a third variant on the theme of corruption in post-
conflict situations. Large-scale fighting ended in 1999, and since then Kosovo
has been largely self-governing under a United Nations Protectorate backed
by NATO security forces." 3 After Serbia rejection of a United Nations
109. See EITI, http://www.eitransparency.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
110. Id.
111. SAVETHECHILDREN, BEYONDTHERHErORIC: MEASURING REVENUETRANSPARENCY; COMPANY
PERFORMANCE INTHEOILAND GAD INDUSTRIES 23 (2005), available at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk.
112. This section was informed by a memo and research help from Dastid Pallaska, Yale LLM '08.
113. S.C. Res. 1244, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). The Special Representative of the
UN Secretary General heads the international civil administration, called the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNIMIK). The cooperating institutions are the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe and the European Union. Two UNMIK resolutions, No. 2001/9 and No. 2002/9 provide the
constitutional framework and incorporate several international human rights treaties. See ABA RULE OF
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proposal a a Kosovo Status Settlement, the Kosovo Assembly issued a
unilateral Declaration of Independence on February 17, 2008 with inter-
national backing. However, its status remains in some doubt given the
opposition of Serbia and Russia."l
4
Kosovo is much smaller than either Angola or Guatemala with a popula-
tion of almost two million, of which ninety percent are of Albanian back-
ground. Unemployment is over fifty percent, and GDP was 2,273 million
euros in 2006, implying a per capita income of about 1,200 euros or U.S.
$1,700, making it very poor both by European standards and compared to the
other cases." 5 However, inequality is not as high as in Angola and Guatemala.
Unlike Angola, Kosovo has no guaranteed source of foreign exchange.
Although technically a part of Europe, its situation is in some ways closer to
that of Guatemala. The war was very destructive, 1 6 the economic situation
very poor, and local institutions are weak.
The main differences compared to the other cases are that the former
fighters and their supporters now control the government inside Kosovo but
have limited discretion because of the presence of outsiders from Europe and
international institutions who provide aid and help maintain political
stability. 1 7 Like Guatemala, the country's poverty and the destructiveness of
the war have given outside actors considerable leverage. For example, the
police include an International Police Force of over one-thousand members
compared to over 7,000 Kosovars, and the judiciary includes fourteen
international judges and ten international prosecutors."18
Corruption in Kosovo is related both to its immediate past history and to
the influx of funds for rebuilding and humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, efforts
to control malfeasance by using outsiders as guarantors and monitors have
sometimes backfired as advisors from the United Nations authority or other
bodies have sometimes participated in corruption themselves.
1. Loci of Corruption
Unlike Guatemala and Angola, Kosovars have been extensively surveyed
since the end of fighting. These data show that perceptions of corruption are
high for many state institutions, but individuals reportedly experience low
LAW INITIATIVE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM INDEX FOR Kosovo, VOLUME 1[ (2007).
114. "Balkan Politics:; All at Sea," The Economist, April 12, 2008 at 58.
115. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN Kosovo (UNMIK), FACT SHEET (Nov. 2007), available at
http://www/unmikonline.orgtdocs2007/FactSheet-nov_2007.pdf.
116. Sannerholm, supra note 3, at 70-71.
117. In this it bears some similarities to Liberia where international institutions also are playing an
important role in the rebuilding effort. See Boucher, supra note 1; Sannerholm, supra note 3, at 85-92.
118. Data of the police from November 2006. UNMIK, supra note 115.
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levels of corruption in their daily lives. A United Nations Development
Program ("UNDP") survey from the third quarter of 2007 broke down
perceptions of corruption by sector."9 According to the survey, 54% of
respondents view the Kosovo Power Corporation ("KEK"), a publicly-owned
enterprise in charge of power supply, as the most corrupt institution. 20 KEK
is followed by the Kosovo Trust Agency ("KTA"), a United Nations controlled
institution overseeing the privatization process, which is perceived as corrupt
by 50% of the respondents. The Kosovo Central Administration (Govern-
ment) is listed third, with 33% of the respondents identifying it as corrupt.
The judiciary is in eighth place, with 15% of the respondents perceiving it as
corrupt. However, only 24% of Kosovo Albanian respondents, 6% of Kosovo
Serb respondents, and 22% of respondents from other minorities consider the
judiciary to be fair and unbiased. Interestingly, the Kosovo Police Service,
which by the nature of its work is in most frequent contact with the citizens,




When the respondents were asked about their personal experience with
corruption, however, the numbers are low. Only 6% of Kosovo Albanians
stated that bribes were solicited from them in exchange for access to public
services, and only 7% of Kosovo Serbs and 4% of other minorities reported
that access to public services was conditioned on requests for favors or bribes.
The statistics show a steady downward trend since the peak in March 2005
when the percentage of actual corruption reported by respondents reached a
high of 23%. 122 The gap between perceptions and experience may be
capturing the distinction between high-level corruption and low-level payoffs
that directly affect ordinary citizens. Media reports affect perceptions, and if
such reports are to be believed, corruption appears to be a serious problem at
the top of government. Furthermore, the inability of law enforcement and
justice authorities thoroughly to prosecute and adjudicate cases of corruption
enhances public distrust. Most prosecutions involved low-level bureaucrats
and not the ultimate beneficiaries of large-scale corrupt deals.
119. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, Kosovo EARLY WARNING REPORT #17 (June-
Sept. 2007).
120. Id. The survey was based on face-to-face interviews and included 1,250 respondents Their ethnic
breakdown was as follows: 851 Kosovo Albanians, 206 K-Serbs, and 193 respondents from other minorities
(44 Bosnian, 22 Gorani, 35 Turks, 35 Ashkali, 37 Roma, 18 Egyptian). The sample was selected through
a random sampling method and was stratified on the basis of geographic regions that are based on telephone
area codes (7) and municipalities (30) and urban rural ratio (4:6). This nationally representative sample is
calculated with a confidence level of 95% which yields a confidence interval (C) of +/- 2.71. For more
information on Methodology of the Survey see UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note
120, at 13.
121. Id. at 30, tbl. 2.7.
122. Id. at 30.
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The Milosevic regime's violent establishment in 1989 fueled corruption,
and the political and social turmoil that led to the 1997-1999 conflict
encouraged corrupt behavior. These events affected societal values and
contributed to a major shift in many people's social stratus. The middle class
faced severe economic pressures and downward mobility. At the same time,
many of those associated with the Milosevic regime (1989-1999) and with the
national liberation movement (1999-present) gained significant political and
economic power and enhanced social status. The sense of impunity felt by
those in power was fed by the Kosovars' general distrust of the judiciary,
which in large part consists of judges and prosecutors who served under the
unpopular Yugoslav justice system-the regime against which most of these
"heroes" fought.
23
During the decade under Milosevic, between 1989 and 1999, state-
sponsored corruption reached its peak. Transparency International has labeled
Milosevic one of the most corrupt leaders in the world with an estimated $1
billion dollars stolen from public funds. 24  Milosevic's denial of public
services to the majority of the Albanian population of Kosovo encouraged
corruption. In practice, the public services that were officially denied to
Kosovar Albanians were on sale. A stringent regulatory system that included
unnecessary and complicated administrative procedures created opportunities
for the solicitation of bribes. For example, procedures for obtaining public
services, such as personal and travel documents or other administrative
permits, were tailored to give discretionary power to low-level bureaucrats
who collected bribes on behalf of the regime. The widespread corruption that
characterized this decade was visible in every aspect of life but was especially
prevalent in the law enforcement and justice systems. In an environment of
lawlessness, where political trials, police brutality, and arbitrary arrests were
officially-sponsored policies, citizens had only one alternative-to buy
themselves out of the situation. In this manner, the adjudication of almost all
types of crimes was transferred from courtrooms to government offices where
bribes were paid. The lack of a reliable banking system, which resulted in a
cash-based economy, meant that most of these transactions left no paper trail.
This situation had long-term negative impacts, which continue to undermine
efforts to build a sustainable, honest society. It entrenched a culture of
corruption deeply in the Kosovo society, limited its moral stigma, and thus
increased public tolerance towards corruption.
Present day perceptions of corruption are, however, also a reflection of
the lack of effectiveness of various public institutions since the end of the
123. See ABA RULEOF LAW INrATlVE, supra note 113, at 3-8.
124. THE MANY FACES OF CORRUPTION, TRACKING VULNERABILrrlES AT THE SECTOR LEVEL Box
12.1 390 (J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan eds.).
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conflict, which may or may not be due to corruption. For example, KEK,
viewed as highly corrupt, is still unable to supply twenty-four hours of
electricity despite the fact that it is highly subsidized by international
organizations and the Kosovo government. In a recent report, the European
Agency for Reconstruction states that the European Union invested 403.2
million euros in KEK between 1999 and 2006.25 The Kosovo government
also has continuously subsidized KEK, and its assistance has almost doubled
each year: 2004 with 13 million euros; 2005 with 28.4 million euros; and 2006
with 45 million euros. 26 Corruption does appear to be part of the explanation
for KEK's ineffectiveness. For example, in 2003 one of KEK's top managers,
a UN-appointed official, was convicted in his home country of Germany of
misappropriating 3.9 million euros from the KEK budget.1
27
Turning to the institution perceived as the second most corrupt, KTA is
in charge of privatization but also oversees the management of publicly-owned
enterprises, including KEK and Post and Telecom of Kosovo ("PTK").
Therefore, its ranking in the survey is partly a function of its primary role in
the appointment of managers for these enterprises. KTA's personnel decisions
seem to have been weak across the board. Furthermore, collaboration between
international advisors and Kosovar managers extended beyond the KEK case
noted above. For example, in April 2004, two top managers of the PTK were
arrested along with their international advisor over allegations of
embezzlement of company funds. The case was never brought to trial and
continues to be in the hands of international prosecutors of the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK").1 28 The involvement of UNMIK officials may
be one reason for the delay.
29
Other cases of corruption and official misconduct detected by the Office
of the Auditor General were not followed up either by UNMIK or by local law
enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, audit reports, widely publicized in the
media, did have political impact and presumably affected public perceptions.
125. European Agency for Reconstruction, From Reconstruction to Reform: EC Support to the Energy
Sector (May 2006), available at http://www.ear.europa.eu/sectors/main/sec-energy.htm.
126. Ministry of Economy and Finance, Kosovo Consolidated Budget, http://www.mfe-
ks.org/mefwww/lajmet/libratebuxhetit.html.
127. Joe Tuschler, a UN appointed manager of KEK, escaped prosecution in Kosovo but was later
arrested and convicted in his home country (Germany) where he was sentenced to three and a half years in
prison. KosovAR STABiLiTY INrTATIV, RECONSTRUCrION SuRvEY, Kosovo 2007 31 (2007).
128. Id. The allegations arose from investigative journalism by Kosovo's leading daily newspaper,
Koha Ditore, which carried out extensive reports alleging misconduct of these individuals and publishing
copies of the fraudulent contracts.
129. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the investigation of this case was delayed by senior UNMIK
officials due to the involvement of its leadership, namely Deputy Head of UNMIK Gerard Fischer and
Rainer Lesar, a high ranking official of the UNMIK Department of Transport and Telecommunication in
this scandal.
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They were effectively utilized by the opposition parties, which in the second
half of 2005 launched an aggressive campaign to discredit the ruling coalition
government. Moreover, following the death of Kosovo's President Ibrahim
Rugova in January 2006, the coalition parties, facing strong criticism over
corruption allegations, also came under immense pressure from the
international community. The pressure was a result of a public outcry that
followed the release of the audit reports and the opposition's success in placing
this topic at the forefront of parliamentary debate. During this period, the
opposition focused on three incidents, which directly exposed corruption
scandals in the three most important institutions in Kosovo: Assembly,
Presidency, and Office of Prime Minister.
The so-called "President-gate" scandal arose from allegations that in
April 2005 the Office of the President embezzled about 1.4 million euros while
procuring six armored vehicles from an automobile dealer in Germany. The
price of the vehicles was allegedly inflated to hide the kickbacks, and the
transaction was done through an intermediary, in other words, a local
businessman close to the President's party who was alleged to have laundered
the proceeds of this crime. 30 In July 2006, three senior officials of the
President's office were indicted by an UNMIK international prosecutor along
with the businessman. According to the indictment, the defendants are alleged
to have paid 338,875 euros for each vehicle whereas the actual cost of vehicles
was 107,000 euros each.' 31
In a similar scandal, Nexhat Daci, the President of the Kosovo Assembly,
was accused by opposition parties of abusing public funds for personal benefit.
The accusations alleged that he ordered a luxurious armored vehicle costing
over 220,000 euros. Money laundering was suspected because the vehicle was
not delivered until a few months after the full payment was made. Addition-
ally, audit reports disclosed a number of other unauthorized expenditures made
by senior staff members at the behest of the President of the Assembly. In
November 2006, following a criminal investigation of these allegations, police
arrested the Assembly President's top advisors.
32
In the summer of 2005, Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi chartered
a private jet to fly back from a vacation in Turkey to an important meeting
with the UN Envoy for the Kosovo Status. The cost of the trip was 20,000
130. An article published by daily Lajm, citing an investigation report from UNMIK Department of
Justice, reveals the involvement of thirteen staff members of the Presidency in the affair. Serbeze Haxhijaj,
Presidentgate, LAJM EKSKLUZrvE, Mar. 25, 2006.
131. Ngritet aktakzua per 4 zyrtare tW larte tW presidences se Kosoves tW perfshiro ne aferen e
veturave, LAIM EKSKLUZrVE, July 21, 2006.
132. These expenditures included purchase of a plasma TV and two power generators for President's
private mountain cabin, skiing lessons for his staff, smart suits, glasses, and dental treatment. INT'L CRISIS
GROUP, KOSOVO STATUS: DELAY Is RISKY 15 n.112 (2006).
2008] 433
HeinOnline -- 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.  433 2008
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
euros. The media widely reported that the jet was not paid for from the
Kosovo budget. In a September 2005 press conference, the Prime Minister
said that the "private jet was paid by his friends." 133 The media and the
opposition described this statement not only as an example of misconduct but
as a statement of impunity. Presumably, the public saw this payment as an
effort by wealthy interests to curry favor with the President. Between March
2005 and March 2006, the government's approval rating dropped from a
record high of 80% down to 42%, while the Assembly's approval rating
dropped from 70% to 4 5 %.'m
These scandals led to a political upheaval in the governing coalition. On
March 1, 2006, the newly-revived leadership of the Democratic League of
Kosovo ("DLK"), the main political party, sacked its two top public
officials. 35 DLK's minority coalition partner, Alliance for Future of Kosovo
(AAK), soon thereafter requested the resignation of its vice-president from the
position of Prime Minister and nominated Lieutenant General Agim Ceku,
Commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps to that post. 36 Ceku, a Croatian
Army General, returned to Kosovo in 1999 and led the Kosovo Liberation
Army through the end of the conflict. As a professional not affiliated with any
political party, his nomination was an effort of the coalition partners to boost
the government's credibility, which had been severely undermined by the
outgoing leadership.
2. The Judiciary and the Prosecutors
So far, we have seen that a culture of impunity seems to be on the wane,
at least for active politicians. The governing coalition reacted strongly to its
loss in popularity by sidelining those accused of improprieties and bringing in
new leadership. However, enforcing the law against corrupt officials will be
difficult if the prosecutors and the judiciary are themselves either corrupt or
biased. As noted above, the population perceives the judiciary to be unfair and
rather corrupt. The ABA study recorded widespread complaints about
advocates who routinely gave gifts to judges and initiated ex parte contacts
with them, and those who bribed judges or prosecutors or who, at least,
133. Avionin ma kanepaguar miqte, KOHA DrroRE, Sept. 8, 2005.
134. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, KOsoVoEARLYWARNINGREPoRT# 113 (July-
Sept. 2005); UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, KOSOVO EARLY WARNING REPORT #13 17, fig.
1.3 (Jan.-June 2006).
135. Those sacked were Nexhat Daci, President of Kosovo Assembly, and Adem Salihaj, Deputy
Prime Minister. Kosovo Information Center ("KIC"), Kryesia e LDK-se shkarkon kryekuvendarin Nexhat
Daci, KOSOvO DAILY REPORT, Mar. 1, 2006.
136. KIC, Kryeministri Kosumi ka dhn dje doreheqjen, e zevendgson Agim Ceku, Kosovo DAILY
REPORT, Mar. 2, 2006.
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accepted payments from clients for that purpose. 137 As Sannerholm states: "In
post-conflict situations, where the judiciary sometimes benefits from a lack of
supervision and a legal 'chaos,' they are not always part of the solution but
part of the problem."'
138
Under the Milosovic regime, Albanian judges and prosecutors were
dismissed, and Albanians were banned from attending the official law school
and from taking the bar exam. Although Kosovar Albanians did establish a
parallel law faculty in Pristina, they could not take the bar exam or practice
law; accordingly many lawyers fled. At the end of the fighting, most
registered advocates were older lawyers trained during the socialist era. 39 As
a result of this history, when UNMIK sought to reestablish courts and pro-
secutorial bodies quickly in 2000, it was severely hampered by the limited
applicant pool. Applicants for judgeships and positions as prosecutors did not
undergo any substantive vetting. Instead, an ad hoc committee was formed,
and it did little more than identify pre-Milosevic regime jurists who had
expressed an interest in returning to work. Despite some minor improvements
in the appointment process with the establishment of the Kosovo Judicial and
Prosecutorial Council ("KJPC") in 2001, the limited number of new appoint-
ments meant that the majority (85%) of presently-serving judges and prosecu-
tors are those who were appointed under this flawed appointment system.
The consequences of this system remain evident. For example, over 95%
of current prosecutors received their academic and professional training in the
Communist system where prosecutors had low public standing and functioned
as little more than government bureaucrats. Similarly, over 95% of the
currently-sitting judges were educated and appointed during an era when they
mainly rendered politically-motivated rulings. These statistics help explain
both the judiciary's low approval ratings and the difficulty of bringing
successful organized crime or public corruption cases.
In 2001, UNMIK established the Judicial Inspection Unit ("JIU") charged
with monitoring judicial performance and investigating judicial and
prosecutorial misconduct. It can refer cases of misconduct for disciplinary
hearings before the Kosovo Judicial Council. According to the U.S. State
Department's Human Rights report, the JIU has processed a total of 1,488
complaints since its establishment, including 448 during 2006. Of those 448,
JIU rejected 221 cases and completed 100 of the 227 investigations it opened.
In the majority of investigations (89), JIU found no misconduct. The unit
referred six cases to the Judicial Council, which heard three by year's end,
137. ABA RuLEOFLAwlNrrATIVE, supra note 113, at41.
138. Sannerholn, supra note 3, at 83.
139. ABA RULE OF LAW INITATIvE, supra note 113, at 3.
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dismissing one judge and recommending three for disciplinary action. Thus,
although the JIJ may yet have an impact, it has gotten off to a slow start.
In 2005, UNMIK and the leaders of the Kosovo judiciary supported an
important law that strengthened the independence of the judiciary. "4 Thus,
in the future it will become even more important to have competent, impartial
judges. Independence is not valuable if it simply leads to impunity and self-
dealing. To improve judicial quality, in December 2006 UNMIK introduced
a comprehensive vetting process for judges and prosecutors.' 4 ' The vetting
process will include a full background check, a professional exam, personal
fitness evaluation, and a meaningful review of the applicant's prior legal work,
if applicable. However, the reappointment process has not yet begun.
The benefits of a well-working vetting process would be manifold. It will
facilitate a smooth transition of generations within the judiciary, given that
over 75% of the current judges and prosecutors are over 60-years-old. A new
generation of judges and prosecutors could energize the public sector and
improve its effectiveness. The vetting process will also lend credibility to the
system, which in turn will result in greater public trust in the judiciary and in
prosecutors. The credibility of the vetting process will bring a degree of
prestige to the positions of judges and prosecutors, which will not only make
these positions more attractive to potential applicants but also give these pro-
fessionals a sense of duty. Moreover, the vetting procedures will strengthen
the claims of the judiciary for a substantial increase of salaries in order to bring
them closer to the salaries of the executive and the legislature and to attract
competent lawyers to careers on the bench. 4
2
In a second major law enforcement reform, on September 30 2006,
UNMIK, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice, established the Kosovo
Special Prosecutors Office ("KSPO"). 143  This office has nationwide
jurisdiction and was created to investigate the most serious cases of organized
crime, public corruption, and terrorism. Five Special Prosecutors are now in
place. They have integrated well into UNMIK's Criminal Division and are
actively working on cases and participating in training activities. UNMIK's
140. UNMIK, REGULATIONS 2005/52: ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOsovo JUDICIAL COUNCIL
(2005).
141. UNMIK, ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTION 2006/18: IMPLEMENTING UNMIK REGULATION 2006/25
ON A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN KosOvo (2006).
142. At present, salaries are low. According to the ABA report, entry level municipal court judges
and prosecutors earn 380 euros per month, and district court judges and prosecutors earn 480 euros per
month. The Chief Prosecutor and the President of the Supreme Court earn 560 euros per month, These are
after-tax figures. In 2006 the average private sector worker earned 211 euros per month. ABA RULE OF
LAW INTIATIVE, supra note 113, at 36.
143. Administrative Direction 2006/15 On the Establishment of the Kosovo Special Prosecutors
Office, 30 September 2006.
[Vol. 34
HeinOnline -- 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.  436 2008
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING
goal is to recruit a total of ten Special Prosecutors, but recruitment remains a
constant challenge, as the nature of the cases handled by Special Prosecutors
may impose greater risks than normally faced by local public prosecutors.
Special Prosecutors are handling more than 30 cases involving criminal
offenses of a type previously investigated and prosecuted exclusively by
UNMIK International Prosecutors. The KSPO is just beginning to obtain
indictments and judicial verdicts in important cases involving drugs, attempted
murder of public officials, and weapons offenses.'" The office has not yet
created any special task forces in conjunction with the police aimed at tackling
more sophisticated forms of organized crime. The limited success of the
KSPO so far is primarily due to the limited applicant pool that includes only
existing prosecutors that were appointed under the flawed process described
above.
3. The Auditor General
When the new leaders took office in 2006, they had available a relatively
new tool of accountability in the Office of the Auditor General ("OAG"),
which was established in November 2003 under UNMIK Regulation 2002/18.
The Auditor General has a full mandate to make audit reports open to the
public and to report on follow-up procedures. The independence of the
Auditor General's office in planning and conducting audits is guaranteed, and
he or she currently reports to the head of UNMIK; in time, he or she will
report directly to the Kosovo Assembly.
After assuming office, Prime Minister Ceku requested external audits in
all ministries and municipalities. According to the U.S. State Department
Human Rights report, at the end of 2006 the Auditor General of Kosovo
performed audits in five municipalities and in six ministries. In most cases,
the Auditor General found major violations pertaining to government
administration, as well as in fiscal management and procurement practices.
Audit reports of the Ministry of Communities and Returns served as the basis
for formal criminal investigations against the Minister on allegations of misuse
144. KSPO concluded its first case, for the offence of Unauthorized Purchase, Possession, Distribution
and Sale of Dangerous Narcotic Drugs, on September 17 with a guilty verdict, resulting in one year
imprisonment. On September 17, an indictment was confirmed in another KSPO case charging five persons
with aggravated attempted murder and weapons offence following the shooting of the Head of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Agency, Anton Berisha and others; In addition, a guilty verdict was issued
on November 12, 2007 in a KSPO case on a charge of Unauthorized Ownership, Control, Possession or Use
of Weapons. The Court issued a sentence of five months imprisonment. UNMIK, Kosovo Special
Prosecutor's Office, UNMIKIPR/1713, Nov. 28, 2007.
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of public office. In response to these events, in November 2006 Prime
Minister Ceku dismissed that Minister from his cabinet.'45
Similar actions were taken by the new President of the Assembly, Kole
Berisha, who ordered an external audit of the Assembly. Audit reports
revealed further wrongdoings by the Assembly's administration under his
predecessor's leadership. Based on the audit findings, Berisha suspended four
senior Assembly officials, including the Permanent Secretary. Furthermore,
in order to determine the involvement of the political leadership of the
Assembly in the documented irregularities, in November 2006, Berisha
established a parliamentary investigation committee. By the end of 2006,
based on the findings of the audit reports, police arrested three of the
suspended officials of the Assembly. 46
The hard work of the Auditor General of Kosovo during 2006 did not go
unnoticed by the groups whose interests were affected. On February 28, 2006,
unknown persons assaulted the Auditor General, leaving her with cuts and
bruises. She was assaulted only two days after the release of a critical audit on
the Prishtina municipality. According to the U.S. State Department Human
Rights report, police investigations into this incident were ongoing at the end
of 2006.
However, in spite of the success of the Office of the Auditor General, one
problem is the unwillingness of the office to move from the simple identifica-
tion of violations to pointing out the responsible officials. Thus, in most cases,
prosecutors were unable to attribute the findings of the audit reports to specific
officials and then transform the reports into prosecutable evidence.
4. Anti-Corruption Agency
In December 2003, the Kosovo government established an Inter-
Ministerial Working Group to develop an Anti-Corruption Strategy. Within
a year the Working Group drafted a strategy that was approved by the
government in March 2004. One of its key objectives was the promulgation
of an Anti-Corruption Plan, which was adopted by the Kosovo Assembly in
March 2005. Following the enactment of the law, in early 2006 the govern-
ment developed a new Anti-Corruption Plan and shortly thereafter established
the Anti-Corruption Council, which in July 2006 appointed the Director of the
Anti-Trafficking Agency ("ATA").
Although in its infancy, the ATA has introduced an important initiative.
In 2007, ATA required that all high-ranking government officials submit
145. KIC, Petkoviq i dorezon doreheqjen Kryeministrit (eku, Kosovo DAILY REPORT, Nov. 27,2006.
146. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2006 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SERBIA 20
(Includes Kosovo) (revised by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rLs/hrrpt/200678837.htm.
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financial disclosure forms. The main problems with this initiative were
enforcement and the fact that the ATA did not release the submitted forms to
the public. When a number of high-ranking officials did not submit their
forms, ATA, after a number of public protests, disclosed the names of these
officials in the media. No follow-up action was reported.
5. Conclusions
In spite of the weaknesses of both democratic and oversight institutions,
Kosovo seems to be on the road to controlling corruption through enhanced
democratic accountability. Although the first round of "heroes" may have
operated with impunity, the press reports on corruption scandals freely. The
impact of these reports is documented in quarterly surveys of public opini3n,
and this has led to the resignation of the implicated politicians. A major
weakness, however, remains the operation of prosecutors and the judiciary
The presence of outsiders with both legal and financial clout has been a
mixed blessing especially when individuals appointed by UNMIK ultimately
succumb to corrupt opportunities themselves. 14 7 However, UNMIK does
appear to have had a positive impact in supporting democratic reform and in
aiding the creation of institutions of accountability and oversight that are now
in the process of being turned over to Kosovars. The legacy of the past affects
the quality of those available for appointment to positions such as judges and
prosecutors, but that problem will be cured with time and can perhaps be
moved along quickly with the aid of UNMIK pressure. Moreover, now that
Kosovo has declared its independence, UNMIK is expected to be replaced
with an EU mission that will have a narrower mandate.
Finally, Kosovo politicians have recognized that the fight against
corruption is not only a noble cause but is also a cause that can get them
elected. An anti-corruption agenda in one dimension along which the
electorate evaluates candidates. This shift in public sentiment will, one hopes,
help extract Kosovo from a vicious cycle of political corruption. And
strengthen its political system.
II[. CONCLUSIONS AND REFORM PROPOSALS
Much has been made of the importance of "political will" and moral
leadership from top officials in establishing effective governments in a post-
conflict setting; but strong leadership and good morals are not sufficient.
147. The scandals may not all be in the past. On December 18, 2007 the Associated Press reported
that a top UN official, Retired U.S. Army General Steven Schook, had left the country and would not have
his contract renewed. The case is pending, but he is reportedly being investigated for his ties to Kosovo
leaders including the Energy Minister and a former Prime Minister.
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Political will by itself can breed autocracy. Moralizing risks degenerating into
empty rhetoric-or worse, witch hunts against political opponents. Policy
must address the underlying conditions that create corrupt incentives, or it will
have little lasting effect.
Some argue that the main cure for corruption is economic growth and that
economic growth is furthered by good policies, especially the promotion of
education.148 However, that claim reflects an overly simplistic view of the
roots of both economic growth and corruption. Particularly in post-conflict
situations, policy recommendations that concentrate only on macro-economic
aggregates are pointless. No growth can occur unless institutions are restored
to at least a minimal level of competency. Corruption is a symptom indicating
that the relationship between the state and the rest of society is dysfunctional,
undermining the legitimacy of the state and leading to wasteful public policies.
Good policies are unlikely to be chosen or to be carried out effectively without
honest institutions.
The conventional options for institutional reform fall into several broad
categories: program redesign, increased transparency and accountability, and,
in severe cases, constitutional change. These are all valuable in post-conflict
state-building, but sometimes they will not be sufficient or even possible
because of the remaining threats of violence and the weakness of the
institutions. I conclude with some proposals that are more directly targeted at
post-conflict situations.
The first line of policy response is the redesign of programs in order to
limit the underlying incentives for payoffs. This might mean eliminating
highly-corrupt programs, but, of course, the state cannot abandon its
responsibilities in many areas where corruption is pervasive. One response is
to limit official discretion by, for example, streamlining and simplifying
regulations, expanding the supply of benefits, making eligibility criteria clear,
introducing legal payments for services, giving officials overlapping jurisdic-
tions to give citizens choices, or redesigning systems to limit delays. Leaders
should consider if reforms in one area will just shift corruption to another part
of the government. Programs may need to be comprehensive to have any
impact. In addition, service delivery can be improved by civil service reforms
that provide better salaries, improved monitoring, and the use of incentives to
increase morale.
The second collection of reform strategies focuses on the accountability
and transparency of government actions. For example, a freedom-of-informa-
tion law can give people access to government information. Many government
decision-making processes should be open to public scrutiny and participation.
148. Edward Glaeseret al., Do Instiutions Cause Growth?, J. OFECON. GROWTH 9, 271-303 (2004);
Edward L. Glaeser & Raven Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J. OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1053 (2006).
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Other options to improve accountability are the creation of independent
oversight agencies and the use of external and internal benchmarks. Ongoing
experiments with grassroots democracy need more study and research in order
to determine their impact and their transferability to other contexts.'49 Open
government also depends upon a vigorous and free media that can perform a
watchdog function. International treaties and organizations such as Trans-
parency International, the World Bank, and the United Nations can help create
an environment in which multinationals limit their corrupt activities.
Third, some countries may need to consider more radical reforms in
government structure. Democracy is valuable for many reasons, but it is hardly
a cure for corruption, as the previously-mentioned cases illustrate. Some
evidence suggests that presidential systems may be especially corrupt.
50
Furthermore, elections are not sufficient in and of themselves. The state must
protect civil liberties and establish the rule of law. Rules must be clear and fair
and be administered in a non-discriminatory fashion. This implies the
assistance of an honest, professional, and independent judiciary as well as the
support of police and prosecutors who have similar levels of integrity and
competence.
With these familiar reform options as background, what are the particular
factors that must be considered in post-conflict polities? What can
international bodies do beyond providing peacekeepers to create a window of
opportunity for reform? Each case is different, but here are some general
suggestions:
* Seek peace agreements that incorporate measures to limit corruption
and that are combined with other policies such as those suggested
below.
* Anti-corruption and government reform efforts can either set the
stage for more reforms or destabilize an already fragile
equilibrium.'15 Thus international peacekeepers may be needed to
create a space in which reform can occur. They can only do this,
however, if they have the resources to operate effectively.5 2
149. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
301 (Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2004).
150. Jana KunicovA & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as
Constraints on Corruption, 35 BRIT. J. OF PoLmcAL ScIENcE 573 (2005).
151. Le Billon, supra note 2.
152. Madelene O'Donnell, Post-conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda, in CVIL WAR AND THE
RULE OF LAW, (International Peace Academy ed., 2006) makes this point by comparing the relatively well-
resourced and effective body in Liberia in 2005 with the poorly funded and ineffective force in Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
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* Pick your battles carefully to achieve some early and visible
victories and to tailor reform programs to the capacities of the
country; in other words, start simple. For example, be sure primary
systems of financial control are in place within the government
agencies before creating secondary bodies such as anti-corruption
commissions. i 3
* Do not simply pour in funds without clear checks on the money's
use. One option for international actors is to use trust funds to
administer aid programs with the ultimate goal of eventually turning
over these programs to the government. "
* International bodies can help buyoff and arrange exile for corrupt
top leaders. This is superior to incorporating them into the govern-
ment.'55 Of course, the cases of Angola and Guatemala illustrate
situations where this strategy is unavailable because allegedly
corrupt leaders were the winners in the civil war.
Review the training and integrity of law enforcement officers,
military personnel, judges, and prosecutors. This may involve mass
firings followed by universal training opportunities (with testing)
before people are hired or rehired. International aid can help
integrate former rank-and-file combatants with financial aid and
training.
" Involve ordinary people and local businesses in oversight and
participation, and provide safe havens for whistleblowers. On the
other hand, eliminate self-help vigilantes and replace them with
regular police forces.' 56
" Restrict the armed force's and other security service's ability to
participate in legal businesses, so that they do not feel enticed to
engage in illegal businesses or accept kickbacks. This may need to
go along with a one-time buyout strategy. Giving them an ongoing
stake in profitable ventures will simply entrench corrupt incentives.
* Create bodies both inside government agencies and independent of
the executive for the administration of a freedom-of-information law
153. Id.
154. For example, the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, operated by the World Bank, channels
funds to the government from twenty-four countries. LoRENzo DE.ESGUES & YAMA TORABI,
RECONSTRUCTION NATIONAL INTEGRrrY SYSTEm SURVEY AFGHANISTAN 2007 17 (2007). In Mozambique
a trust fund for the funding of political parties accepts foreign donations. O'Donnell, supra note 152.
155. Le Billon, supra note 2. On the problems that arose from incorpoartion of warlords into the
Afghan government, see DESLEGUES, supra note 154; O'Donnell, supra note 152.
156. Oversight can be facilitated by involving established local organizations such as religious bodies.
In Afghanistan, for example, one decentralized aid program uses local mosques as places to display results
and financial accounts. DESLEGUFs, supra note 154, at 17.
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to audit and monitor government spending. Strengthen the indepen-
dence of prosecutors and courts. International technical assistance
can help improve internal financial controls, establish independent
agencies, develop methods to incorporate public input, and train
governmental personnel or media. Stress the creation of systems to
monitor public spending and policymaking, not just to control the
disbursement of aid funds. 1
" Encourage more systematic study of interventions by international
bodies to see what works and what does not, including the gathering
of baseline data so that donors can track programs as they develop
and document progress or setbacks.
* At the global level, international organizations should work to
encourage more transparency in international business deals and to
develop stronger international controls on money laundering to
make it more difficult for corrupt officials to export their gains.
Strong leadership at the top of the state is needed as a post-conflict state
moves toward the goal of a more legitimate and better functioning govern-
ment. At the same time, the reconstruction process needs to sideline those who
have in the past used the state as a tool for private gain. International
assistance can help, but it needs to be narrowly tailored to avoid exacerbating
the underlying problems created by the mixture of corruption and threats of
violence from those both inside and outside the government. Perhaps the most
difficult cases are those where violence is unlikely to return, but where a
corrupt elite system remains in power through control of both valuable
resources and the levers of state power.
157. A positive case is an effort by an aid-financed NGO to limit payoffs in river transport in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. It achieved slow success over time with mixture of information
provision, consultation with local actors, and the introduction of two-way radios. MICHAEL BROWN ET AL.,
COMBATING Low-LEVEL CORRUPTIONON WATERWAYS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
APPROACHES FROM BANDUNDU AND EQUATEUR PROVINCES (George Washington Univ. Law School 2004).
Another example is the control of education subsidies in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Losses of 45.1% of the
total were controlled by hiring an independent auditor to deliver the funds to local schools. This apparently
cut loses but was itself expensive, costing the Ministry 12% of the funds dispersed. Bu-BUAKEI JABBI,
supra note 8, at 100.
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